IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

RENETTO, LLC,)

Plaintiff,) Civil No. 07-789

VS. November 2, 2007

PROFESSIONAL SALES AND MARKETING GROUP, LLC,

Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

MOTIONS HEARING

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GERALD BRUCE LEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: OBER KALE GRIMES & SHRIVER

BY: ANTHONY VITTORIA, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT: POLSINELLI SHALTON WELTE SUELHAUS

BY: WILLIAM BLAKELY, ESQ.

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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR

U.S. District Court

401 Courthouse Square, 5th Floor

Alexandria, VA 22314

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(Thereupon, the following was heard in open
 1
       court at 12:02 p.m.)
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                     THE CLERK: Civil action 07-789, Renetto
 3
       versus Professional Sales and Marketing Group.
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                     MR. VITTORIA: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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       Anthony Vittoria on behalf of Renetto, LLC.
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                     THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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       William Blakely on behalf of Professional Sales and
 9
       Marketing.
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                     THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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                     I'm ready.
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.
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       May it please the Court, the issue here today is whether
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       or not the First Filed Doctrine should be applied and this
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       case be dismissed and/or transferred back to the Northern
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       District of Illinois where the same claims that are before
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       this Court are already being litigated.
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                     And the second issue and related issue is
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       whether or not there's personal jurisdiction over this
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       defendant, Professional Sales. And we submit, Your Honor,
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       that the answer is no. No, because one, they're not
       sufficient minimum contacts. And two, that in order for
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       there to be personal jurisdiction this case that would be
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       in violation of due process because there was no
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purposeful intention to do anything in the Commonwealth of Virginia by this defendant.

And, I would like to first address the issue of the First Filed Doctrine, Your Honor. This case was initially filed by the defendant, and I'll just refer to it as Professional Sales and PSM. They filed in Cook County in Illinois.

Now that case was removed and I believe properly removed by Renetto to Northern District of Illinois. That occurred, the removal date, I have that here.

THE COURT: Well, that's when it gets interesting. And I'm trying to figure out what was the status of the case at the time the Virginia suit was filed. Hadn't the judge in Illinois dismiss the case?

MR. BLAKELY: Well, what he did, first it was removed and then sua sponte he entered an order that did a number of things. We've attached that order here in our pleading.

And the Court ordered the parties, one, to exhaust settlement of possibilities; two, to file a joint status report by August 20th; and then three, he entered a conditional dismissal order by noting that the state court complaint is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate amended federal complaint.

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THE COURT: So, it was dismissed, huh?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Well, it was conditionally
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       dismissed, Your Honor. What happened it was just --
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                     THE COURT: Conditionally pregnant? It was
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       either dismissed or wasn't, wasn't it? It was dismissed,
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6
       right?
                     MR. BLAKELY: I'm just saying there was a
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       continuing existence of jurisdiction by that court. The
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       parties had to, one, engage in settlement. They had to
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       file papers with the court. And --
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                     THE COURT: They could have walked away,
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       couldn't they?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I'm sorry.
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                     THE COURT: The plaintiff could have walked
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       away, couldn't they? They didn't have to refile.
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                     MR. BLAKELY: In this case, I don't believe
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       they could have, Your Honor. I believe they would have
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1.8
       had to report back to the court.
                     There was a court -- they had to file
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       actually a joint status report by order of court of
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       eight -- and it was to be returned on 8-20.
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                     I mean, I don't believe -- and by the way,
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       Your Honor, they entered then. They filed a motion to
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       amend the complaint. It was not a new complaint that was
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       filed, not a new number order. They filed an amended
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complaint because this Court continued to have jurisdiction over the parties.

And what happened is that as soon as -apparently Renetto believed that there was not going to be
a settlement. He raced up to Virginia and filed a
complaint here. And now that we have this Northern
District of Illinois, there's been an amended complaint
filed, then an answer filed. They have set down a
discovery schedule, and I believe discovery ends on
April 30th.

So, we have that, you know, sort of unusual situation where there was a -- what I refer to -- my words, Your Honor, not in the order -- but conditional dismissal. But the Court didn't just dismiss the case because they ordered the parties to do a number of things and report back to the Court and to make Court filings.

So, to respond to your point, Your Honor, I don't believe they could have just walked away without at least being in violation of the Court.

And I want to add one other things that's important. The Court ordered -- and I believe this is a quote, the Court ordered the parties to quote, "exhaust all settlement possibilities before any pleadings are filed".

So, what happened is they were caught in the

unique position of not being able to amend the complaint which is really what they were trying to do because they had a state court complaint and they would have to make it compliant with the federal rules.

But the Court ordered them not to -- not to file any pleading until they had exhausted settlement.

Then they had to report to the Court on that settlement and then they had to file a joint status report by August 20th.

And before that on I believe it was

August 9th, Renetto, after having had some settlement

discussions -- that wasn't there. I don't know, but had

settlement discussions. They declared settlement

apparently over and filed this complaint in this court.

THE COURT: All right. Well, so I understand it, to be clear, your argument about first file is the case started in Illinois and is still going in Illinois and ought to go to Illinois.

MR. BLAKELY: That's true.

THE COURT: I understand that argument.

MR. BLAKELY: And secondly, the other point I'd like to make, Your Honor, is the personal jurisdiction argument.

Number one, there was nothing that was directed by the defendant in this case into the

Commonwealth of Virginia except I believe that there were 1 initially one and I think perhaps two follow-up phone 2 calls that were made at the suggestion of Renetto to call 3 another party Swimways and by the way, Swimways is a party 4 that is in the litigation in Illinois as a -- as a 5 co-defendant with Renetto. 6 And so there was nothing -- this case 7 involves, Your Honor, these Canopy Chairs. I don't mean 8 to go into the facts too much because I don't know that 9 it's that pertinent. 10 But the point is that our client actually 11 helped market these Canopy Chairs that were designed by 12 Renetto. 13 THE COURT: So your job was to sell the 14 Canopy Chairs? 15 MR. BLAKELY: That's exactly correct. 16 THE COURT: And, did you sell the Canopy 17 Chairs to Target and to companies that do business in 1.8 19 Virginia? MR. BLAKELY: What happened was, Your Honor, 20 there were agreements to sell those products. They went 21 to various companies, but nothing -- they indicated in 22 their brief that they were Virginia distributors. That is 23 not correct. What they were, they were national chains. 24

Apparently they have some distribution points in this

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Commonwealth. But, there was nothing that was purposely directed as the citations refer to.

THE COURT: Well, help me with that. I understand what purposeful availment means and I think you do too. But my question is in today's global economy, a company that manufacturers Canopy Chairs does not want to just sell them in Illinois because there are not that many beaches in Illinois. You want to sell them in Virginia Beach and North Carolina and South Carolina as well. Is that right?

MR. BLAKELY: Your Honor, what they did is they sold them to I believe --

THE COURT: No, my question was very precise. You're a national -- you're selling a product that you want to market in Virginia, North Carolina, South
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 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{BLAKELY}\colon$$ I think that was up to the party we sold them to.

It's a Canopy Chair, right?

Carolina and Florida, any place that has a beach, right?

THE COURT: No, no. Come on. Come on.

Come on. If you sell it to Walmart or you sell it to

Target and you know the Target is in Virginia, you want to
sell chairs, right? And you earn a fee when chairs are
sold to that national chain, don't you?

MR. BLAKELY: You want to sell chairs to

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that chain, but there is not --
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                     THE COURT: So, then like International Shoe
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       then when you put these chairs into commerce in Virginia,
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       you're doing business here, aren't you?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Yes, but you refer to --
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                     THE COURT: Is that yes or no? You didn't
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       answer that question. Did you answer yes?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Better ask me the question
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       again, Your Honor.
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                     THE COURT: My question was if you put into
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11
       the stream of commerce these chairs to -- I don't want to
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       use the Walmart. Let's say Target. And Target is in the
       Eastern District of Virginia and you know those chairs are
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       going to be sold here, is that purposeful availment for
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      purposes of the Long-arm Statute?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I don't believe it is, Your
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17
       Honor.
                     THE COURT: Why not?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I think you have to have an
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       intent to direct it into the Commonwealth. There was a
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       case, the case involving the tire and the inner tube
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      tires. I believe it was --
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                     THE COURT: Kumho Tires?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: And there, yes, tires are
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      distributed to various districts, various states. But you
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have to have a purposeful intent to direct your activities into the Commonwealth.

In this particular case, there was no contact with the Commonwealth except for I believe there were three phone calls to Swimways.

It is apparently true that I believe Sears and a couple of other of these groups that were distributors have -- have distributed some of these -- of Canopy Chairs into the Commonwealth. But that was not Professional Sales that did that. They weren't directing them into the Commonwealth and I believe that's what's required, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BLAKELY: So, in summary, I'll just conclude that there are really three reasons. One, there's a very active case right now pending in the Northern District of Illinois.

Your Honor, I want to also note that the answer that was filed there I believe that what we have in this case is a mandatory counterclaim in Northern District of Illinois. And in this particular case, the claims that have been asserted by Renetto, the response, if there's going to be one through an answer by Professional Sales, will mandate that we will have to file a mandatory counterclaim back against -- or compulsive counterclaim

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back against the plaintiff, and it will be the same basic
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       lawsuit that we have in the Northern District of Illinois.
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                     It is a clear -- I believe the jurisdiction
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       clearly was asserted by the defendant in this action,
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       Professional Sales, as a plaintiff in the Northern
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       District of Illinois. That's where I submit the proper
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       jurisdiction for this case is, and I request the Court
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       honorably to please transfer the case back to Illinois or
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       dismiss it. Thank you.
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                     THE COURT:
                                 Thank you.
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                     MR. VITTORIA: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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       Anthony Vittoria on behalf of plaintiff, Renetto.
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                     THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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                     MR. VITTORIA: I think the Court's hit the
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       head about the conditionally or partially pregnant or
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       partially dismissed.
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                     In fact, I think the defendant has gone a
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       great way in mischaracterizing the line order of the
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       federal court in Illinois. It wasn't an order. It was
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       just a statement. There was nothing that the parties had
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       to do.
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                     This suit is dismissed without prejudice to
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       the filing of an appropriate amended federal complaint or
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       timely motion to remand.
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                     The plaintiff in that case, PSM, had the
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option of filing an amended complaint or filing a motion to remand.

The parties are also requested, not ordered, requested to fully exhaust all settlement possibilities for this dispute prior to filing any further pleadings.

They're requested. They were not ordered.

We were not ordered to go to settlement negotiations. If PSM wanted to file an amended complaint, if they wanted to file a motion to remand, we were requested to go to settlement negotiations. We were not ordered. And the parties were then to file a joint status report by August 20, 2007.

I submit, Your Honor, the Court isn't going to track down PSM and sanction them for failing to file a status report for this case that's already been dismissed.

And as further evidence that the case was dismissed, Your Honor, I have here the electronic filing receipts that you get for filing electronic documents. I printed out a couple of them.

PSM's counsel filed a couple of attorney appearances in the case on August 17th of 2007. One for Carina Segalini, another for Anthony Nasharr and it provides the name of the case, the case number, file of Professional Sales and Marketing Group, Inc. And underneath it in bold all caps, warning, colon, case

1 closed on 10-17-2007.

This case was closed, Your Honor. It was not active. There was no promise this case was going to be revived by PSM.

Accordingly, Renetto had its own claims. It is really based in Columbia, Maryland. A lot of its critical witnesses are located here in the Eastern District of Virginia. It's a very convenient forum. It's a very quick forum, Your Honor. Our witnesses are here. They're subject to subpoena here, so we filed in the Eastern District of Virginia to have our case, our claims adjudicated.

So, accordingly, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, is there personal jurisdiction here? Counsel says that the company does not do business here, does not sell here. It may have sold to national chains, but didn't intend to sell in Virginia.

MR. VITTORIA: Your Honor, I would respectfully disagree. My understanding of large chains such as Target and Walmart, their national offices are -- in the case of Target is in Minnesota. The national chain for Walmart is in Arkansas.

All the products that are sold in the Walmart are not all delivered to Arkansas and then Arkansas deliveries them to all the thousands of different

Walmarts.

What happens is the particular companies that are wanting to sell through Walmart actually deliver the chairs to the individual locations or whatever the product is, they deliver it to the Walmart in Frederiksberg, Virginia. They deliver to the Walmart in Woodbridge, Virginia. They don't deliver to Arkansas and then Walmart delivers it out.

So for those chairs to get into Virginia, it's my understanding that would have to have been delivered by PSM or its manufacturer or somebody on their behalf into this district.

So, of course, they were trying to sell chairs here. They might not have thought in Illinois
Virginia is our market. We need to go there. We want to sell chairs there. They wanted to sell as the Court correctly pointed out anywhere where they could get a market, and one of those places was in the Eastern
District of Virginia because of Virginia Beach, because
Ocean City, Maryland is close by, because Nags Head is close by. Because there are ball fields everywhere where people would like to sit in chairs that are in shade.

So of course, they directed their attention here.

THE COURT: But if this chair collapsed on a

person sitting in Virginia Beach, they wouldn't be able to bring a lawsuit against PSM because PSM does not do business in Virginia?

MR. VITTORIA: I believe they would be able to bring a lawsuit against PSM, Your Honor.

But, I also -- I also wanted to point out that we have a tort claim. We have a tort claim about the intentional interference with business relations and that is related to this phone call made by PSM's officer to Swimways which is located in Richmond, Virginia.

And that, Your Honor, that's a tort here.

So that's an independent separate grounds for jurisdiction in this court.

Now, PSM relies heavily on the New Wellington case. Well, the New Wellington case is inapposite here, Your Honor.

That is a case there wasn't even a tort claim alleged. The only grounds that the plaintiff in that case alleged personal jurisdiction was on -- there was a contract claim. But in the argument at the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff said, well, listen, Your Honor, we have a tort claim, and that's another basis for jurisdiction. But, there was no actual tort claim in the complaint.

Here we have a tort claim in the complaint.

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And so, it's been alleged and if -- I think what PSM is
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       really doing is focusing a lot on paragraph four of
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       Renetto's complaint which is the paragraph on
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       jurisdiction.
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                     If it pleases the Court, we'll amend that to
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       add an additional statement that jurisdiction is founded
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       in this court based on this tort that occurred in this
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       Commonwealth.
                     But ultimately, that's exalting form over
       substance, Your Honor. We have a tort that occurred in
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       this jurisdiction in this district. And we also have PSM
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       conducting business in this jurisdiction.
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                     So, I don't think that there's any question
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       there's personal jurisdiction here, Your Honor.
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                     THE COURT: And you think there's personal
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       jurisdiction because they're transacting business in
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       Virginia by selling the chairs here?
                     MR. VITTORIA: I believe that is one ground.
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       I also believe the --
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                     THE COURT: And also the tort grounds in
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       terms of Swimways -- the phone call to Swimways' counsel?
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                     MR. VITTORIA: Yes, Your Honor.
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                     THE COURT: All right. I think understand
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       your position.
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                     MR. VITTORIA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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1 MR. BLAKELY: Can I just have a brief 2 moment, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. BLAKELY: The first point I'd just like 4 to read from the order. It is attachment B, Your Honor, 5 to our reply brief. And the order reads after careful 6 view of the recently removed state court complaint, said 7 complaint, quote, "is dismissed without prejudice to the 8 filing of an appropriate amended federal complaint or a 9 10 timely motion to remand". And then the judge or the entry continues: 11 12 "The parties to file a joint status report by 8-20-2007." And that's of course following this discussion that they 13 have to exhaust settlement discussions before they file 14 15 any amended complaint. So, my point is, Your Honor, and I really do 16 dispute opposing counsel. I believe the parties were 17 18 obligated to file a status report by the order of that 19 Judge, Judge Cast -- Castillo, excuse me, on August 20, 20 2007. This case was not just summarily dismissed 21 22 without prejudice and without any further action of the

parties. The Court thereby retained jurisdiction over
this case, over the actions of the parties and requiring
them to respond back to the Northern District of Illinois.

The second point I'd like to quote from the Eastern District of Virginia case in the Affinity matter that we cited in our brief. And, there referring to the due process requirement, Your Honor. And it requires the contract must have a substantial connection with the forum state.

And in addressing the point that we have discussed here today which is the purposeful direction of activities of the court in this case noted that one, in this case -- in the case that's being cited, the contract was finalized in that case in Alaska. Our case was finalized in I believe it was Illinois and there were discussions overseas that the certain terms were negotiated by telephone between Virginia and Alaska. That didn't happen. There was no contact by telephone other than the contact with this potential third party defendant Swimways.

The defendant, and this is what I believe is important, the defendant made no purposeful effort of its own to develop a market in Virginia.

And that is what I'm saying in this particular case, Your Honor. And I'll conclude that the defendant in this case did not make any purposeful effort to develop anything into Virginia. Yes, they did enter into a sales agreement with --

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THE COURT: So, if a Canopy Chair collapsed
 1
       on a person at Virginia Beach, they could not bring a
 2
       claim against PSM. Is that right?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I believe that would be right,
 4
       Your Honor. I believe there would be a challenge to that.
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       That's correct.
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                     THE COURT: So in your view, the consumer
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       injured when a Canopy Chair collapsed in Virginia Beach
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       could not bring a claim against PSM because PSM is not
9
       doing business in Virginia under the Long-arm Statute.
                                                               Is
10
       that right?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: Well, in this particular case,
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       Your Honor --
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                     THE COURT: My question is very precise.
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       Could you answer my question.
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I think the answer to that is
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17
       yes.
                     THE COURT: That they could?
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I think they could not.
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                     THE COURT: Okay.
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                     MR. BLAKELY: I think they would have to
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       challenge that. Yes, that's correct.
                     THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
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                     This matter is before the Court on the
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25
       defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
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jurisdiction and for transfer of venue. And this is a case involving claims brought by Renetto, a Maryland company, alleged inventor of the chair that plan to sell with Swimways, a Virginia corporation, I guess a marketing company which was intending to purchase the right to market the chair and PSM, Professional Sales and Marketing Group.

And my reading of the papers suggest that PSM engages in marketing of products and that their goal was to sell this chair and that's what one of the agreements attached demonstrates.

And the agreement itself that's been provided, at least in this meeting footnote talks about PSM is authorized to sell the Canopy Chair at its discretion through 2006 calendar year. And it also refers to "will not sell to certain retail without authorization", but there's some indication that the chair has been sold to national retailers, including Target.

The legal question is whether there is personal jurisdiction over PSM in Virginia. And in my view, there is personal jurisdiction because PSM is transacting business in Virginia by distributing the Canopy Chairs for sale in national and regional retail chain locations in Virginia and has sufficient contacts with Virginia to satisfy due process.

I recognize that the case was filed in Illinois first. However, it appears to me at the time this lawsuit was filed, the Illinois case had been dismissed.

The Virginia Long-arm Statute 8.01328.1(a) encompasses anyone who acts directly or by agent as to a cause of action arising from a person's transacting business in this Commonwealth. That's (a)1.

And the statute is sufficient to encompass even a single act -- transaction under the English and Smith case.

I don't think it's a close call. And again, there's certainly maybe another reading of it. But the cases that I've read suggest that here where you have multiple sales transactions of these chairs through Virginia stores, based upon the contract entered into by PSM with the national retailer that that fulfills the requirements of Virginia Long-arm Statute and I'll cite Anita's New Mexico Style Mexican Food case from the Fourth Circuit in 2000. And also I'll cite the case of LG Electronics and Beverly Hills Fan.

All these seem to me to suggest that where you have this national chain, you have this product being sold nationally, and it's here in Virginia that it is sufficient for purposes of demonstrating a transacting

business to meet the requirements of the Long-arm Statute.

And I also think that if the answer to the question is that a consumer who is on Virginia Beach and this chair collapses on her cannot bring a lawsuit against the company that sold the chair through Target that she purchased in the Target store in Virginia, if that doesn't fall within the Long-arm Statute, then we have a real problem.

So for those reasons, I think that the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be denied. And I'm going to deny the motion to transfer venue because the defendant did not make any showing of what witnesses or proof was in Illinois.

He says that there is, but there was no affidavit setting forth any information about which documents are in the Northern District of Illinois, what witnesses are there. And in the absence of some evidence to support that, there is no basis here under 1404 to change venue. So motion to change venue is denied.

Thank you.

MR. BLAKELY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. VITTORIA: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings concluded at 12:26 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I, Renecia Wilson, an official court reporter for the United State District Court of Virginia, Alexandria Division, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had upon the motions in the case of Renetto vs. Professional Sales. I further certify that I was authorized and did report by stenotype the proceedings and evidence in said motions, and that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 to 23, inclusive, constitute the official transcript of said proceedings as taken from my shorthand notes. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto subscribed my name this 19th day of November 2007. Renecia Wilson, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter